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Abstract
Confederate bids (i.e. bids placed by sellers’ confederates) may be used to
evade placement costs for a high reserve price, without increasing the risk of un-
acceptably low auction outcomes. We present three field experiments with parallel
auctions of identical items, using five different reserve price and confederate bid
settings. We find the prices to be highest with optimal reserve prices and optimal
confederate bids. The expected net revenues, however, are highest with optimal
confederate bids and minimum reserve prices. Finally, field data suggest that opti-
mal confederate bids may be frequently used by sellers.
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1 Introduction
The growing flexibility of online auctions provides sellers with an increasing set of
strategic design features. While many of these design features have been investigated
empirically and theoretically,1 there are hardly any studies that examine the effect of
confederated bids in auctions. A confederated bid is a single bid placed by a confederate
of the seller ensuring that the item is not sold below the seller’s reservation price. Hence,
confederate bids resemble reserve prices (or "starting prices") that are hidden from the
other bidders.
We present three field experiments.2 First, in the field experiments 1 and 2, we compare
the auction outcomes with and without confederate reserve prices bids. The confederate
bid in our first experiment is set to one increment below the sellers’ estimated average
willingness-to-accept (WTA). We furthermore compare these auctions to auctions with
a public reserve price set at the level of the sellers’ WTA. The difference between the
two experiments is that in the first case we auction items that have a "thick" market
(blockbuster DVDs), while in the second case we auction items that have a "thin" mar-
ket (memorial coins in a coin booklet). In a third field experiment, we again auction
blockbuster DVDs, but instead of using the estimated sellers’ WTA, we use the optimal
reserve price both in the treatment with the confederate bid and in the treatment with
the public reserve price.3 To derive the optimal reserve price we introduce a method of
estimating the distribution of values from previous auction data.
1See Ockenfels, Reiley, and Sadrieh (2006) for an overview.
2Field experiments are different from classical laboratory experiments, mainly because we cannot
control for buyers’ valuations. However, while we lose control concerning the valuations, we gain higher
external validity than laboratory experiments generally have. Kagel (1995) surveys some of the classical
auction experiments. Newer work is presented by Abbink, Brandts and Pezanis-Christou (2006), Goeree
and Offerman (2003), Kirchkamp, Poen and Reiss (2009), Brosig and Reiss (2007).
3We never harm the buyers with our confederate bids. If the confederate bid affected the final price
(i.e. the buyer had to pay our bid plus an increment), we contacted the buyer and sent him/her back the
item and the entire amount paid. Hence, these buyers received the item basically for free.
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Our main research question is how sellers’ revenues are affected by confederate bids and
public reserve prices. Should the revenue of both formats be equal, confederate bidding
can be regarded as an effective cost reduction measure for sellers, who can save the auc-
tion fee that is charged for public reserve prices. However, it is possible that revenues
from the auction formats differ, either because bidders behavior depends on the presence
of public reserve prices or because the number of active bidders differs across the two
auction formats. In the first case, it is possible that the existence of a public reserve
price has a psychological effect on the bidders, e.g. boundedly rational bidders may an-
chor their bids on the reserve price (Kauffman and Wood (2003)). In the second case,
in which we assume that the public reserve price reduces the number of active bidders,
some authors conjecture that prices maybe lower due to a lower level of "auction fever"
(Heymann, Orhun, and Ariely (2004)).
In our first two field experiments, parallel auctions of identical units of a popular DVD
and a German memorial coin are used to compare revenues attained with the three differ-
ent reserve price settings. We repeatedly run three parallel auctions of each object on an
online auction platform, one with a WTA reserve price, one with the minimum reserve
price and a WTA confederate bid, and finally one with the minimum reserve price and
no further manipulation. Since the only difference between any three auctions running
at the same time is the constellation of the public reserve price and the confederate bid,
any observed difference presents a systematic effect of the seller’s strategic choice.
We find that the sales prices in all three types of auctions are statistically indistinguish-
able. However, in the DVD experiment, the seller’s payoff is significantly lower in the
case with a WTA reserve price, due to the higher auction fee.4 In our memorial coin
experiment, we find no significant difference in the seller payoffs, even though the av-
4While a substantial placement fee must be paid to place a public reserve price, the confederate bid
incurs only low cost, especially when the submission is automated.
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erages hint in the same direction. Hence, our study indicates that sellers may have a
financial incentive to use minimum reserve prices or WTA confederate bidding in order
to evade the auction fees for public reserve prices.
In the third field experiment, in which we use optimal reserve prices, we find signifi-
cantly fewer successful auctions using the optimal reserve price (both as a public reserve
price and as a confederate bid) compared to the case with a minimum reserve price. The
successful auctions, however, result in significantly higher prices with optimal reserve
price than without. Taking these two effects together and considering the auction fees,
we find that the auctions with a public optimal reserve price yield significantly lower
expected net revenues than the auctions with optimal confederate bids and the auctions
without any manipulation. While we find no significant difference in the expected net
revenues of the latter two treatments, a comparison of the prices that we achieve in our
auctions with the prices of similar auctions conducted at the same time on the online
auction platform indicates a widespread usage of confederate bidding.
2 Hypothesis and the Related Literature
In this section, we introduce a number of alternative hypotheses and relate them to the
empirical and theoretical literature in the field. We restrict our attention mainly to empir-
ical work on online auctions and the theoretical work on the corresponding independent
private value model of open English auctions.5 Both the theoretical and empirical results
reported in this literature on public reserve prices and confederate bids are ambiguous.
While some authors report a positive impact of higher public reserve prices on the auc-
tion revenues, others find the opposite results.
5Clearly, one could argue that many of the empirical observed auctions may concern goods that have
some common value element. However, like most papers in the field, we focus on the independent private
value setting because the informational structure of most online auctions corresponds more closely to a
standard private value model including a known minimum value that is common knowledge.
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Hypothesis 1a: Higher prices with high public reserve prices than without.
Hypothesis 1b: Lower prices with high public reserve prices than without.
Ariely and Simonson (2003) examine data for the tickets of a sports event. They show
that the starting price and the total number of bids received have strong positive effects
on the auction prices, whereas auction duration had a negative effect. They also conduct
a field experiment in which various items (i.e. DVD, VHS, webcams and keyboards)
were auctioned online. The level of the starting price (public reserve price) is varied,
where in some cases the two variants are run in sequence (low comparability) and in
other cases the two variants are run insimultaneously (high comparability). They find
a strong positive effect of the WTA reserve price on the final price, but only in the low
comparability treatment. In a recent paper, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2005) show theo-
retically that these results are in line with the model that incorporates a reference point
effect in the bidders utilities.
In contrast, some authors seem to have evidence for a negative impact of the public re-
serve price on the number of active bidders. Bajari and Hortascu (2003), for example,
examine 407 eBay coin auctions and show that auction entry is significantly reduced
with a WTA reserve price. They conjecture that the lower number of bidders effects
the sellers’ revenues negatively. While it is clear that participation by low value bidders
(i.e. bidders with a value below the sellers reserve price) should rationally have no ef-
fect on the auction outcome, a number of authors argue that high activity may create
a competitive atmosphere, in which bidders are infected by auction fever, i.e. a psy-
chological dynamic that induces higher bids from all bidders (Heymann, Orhun, and
Ariely (2004) and Häubl and Popkowski (2003)). Ehrhart, Ott and Abele (2006) observe
in their experiment that auction dynamics lead to higher bids. Furthermore, they find
higher bids in these auctions when they allow for a psychologically induced feeling of
ownership (pseudo-endowment effect) of the item. Auction fever would also explain
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why prices paid in online auctions are frequently higher than the price quoted by online
shops (Ariely and Simonson (2003)).
Hypothesis 2a: Higher prices with confederate bids than without.
Hypothesis 2b: Lower prices with confederate bids than without.
Some of the empirical literature on online auctions suggests that replacing WTA reserve
prices by a minimum reserve price and a WTA confederate bid will increase final prices
in the auction. Kauffman and Woods (2005) examine ca. 1000 coin auctions on ebay.
They identify "Premium Bids" that are assumed to be placed by confederate. Control-
ling for a number of other parameters, e.g. number of bidders, weekend sale, presence
of an object picture and sellers reputation, they report a significantly positive effect of
the premium bid on the final sales price. This result supports their earlier finding (Kauff-
man and Woods (2003)) that coin auctions with "questionable bids" attain higher selling
prices than those without.6
There is no empirical evidence to support the opposite hypothesis. This may be due to
the fact that finding evidence would require knowledge on bidders’ beliefs concerning
the existence and extend of confederate bidding. A number of authors argue that both
bidder participation and revenues are lower when bidders believe to face confederate
bidding.7
Hypothesis 3a: Higher prices with confederate bids than with WTA reserve
prices.
Hypothesis 3b: Lower prices with confederate bids than with WTA reserve
prices.
6Questionable bids that roughly correspond to early jump bids that are rarely successful and are placed
by bidders who concentrated their bidding on specific sellers.
7Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) show theoretically that bidders activity is negatively correlated
to confederate bidding because bidders discount the information context of observe bids. Although they
use a common value setting to give a rational account, a similar effect can be easily shown in a private
value setting based on psychological bidder reaction. Kosmopoulou and De Silva (2007) give experimental
support for the negative effect of seller participation.
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Once a seller has decided to set a reserve price, the question is whether it will be more
beneficial to do so in public or behind the scenes. Izmalkov (2004) shows that the two
alternatives are theoretically outcome equivalent in an independent private value English
auction because there exists an equilibrium in which the seller can achieve the optimal
mechanism outcome by using confederate bids instead of a public reserve price. Sinha
and Greenleaf (2000) provide theoretical reasons that the effect may go either way in a
richer model. Their results depend on numerous parameters that are extremely difficult
to observe in the field, one crucial parameter is the "aggressiveness" of bidders’ bidding
strategies, which - depending on its value - can support either hypothesis above. While
no field evidence has been provided yet, Katkar and Reiley (2005) have experimental
evidence showing that auctions with secret reserve prices tend to raise less revenue than
auctions with public reserve prices.
3 Experimental Design
The basic concept of the experiment is to auction identical items at the exact same time
with the exact same description and to only vary the reserve price parameter. We com-
pare an auction with a minimum reserve price (the lowest starting price allowed) to an
auction with a WTA reserve price (not higher than 50 percent of the retail price) and to
an auction with confederate bid at the level of the WTA reserve price.
We conducted multiple rounds of auctioning on an online auction platform. In each
round, the auctions ran in parallel, starting and ending at exactly the same time. We
auctioned two different types of items, 60 DVDs of the movie „The Lord of the Ring 3 -
The Return of the King" and 30 memorial coins in a coin booklet. We chose these two
items in order to check possible effects of the sales volume. At the time of experiment,
the DVD represented a blockbuster item with high sales volume. In contrast, the coin is
a collectors item that is sold infrequently. Since all the DVDs and the coins were new
items, we have no reason to doubt the assumption that they were homogeneous goods.
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To ensure an identical design for all auctions, we use the same item title, item descrip-
tion and picture for every transaction. We specified that the item will only be shipped
to bidders in Germany. The only shipping option that we provided was insured shipping
with the German shipping service DHL.
We started the first session at 8:00 a.m. and the next session at 8:00 p.m. This sequence
was repeated throughout the experiment. The reason for this auction schedule was to
check for possible effects, due to the starting time. Our 3 auction formats and the varied
starting time constitute a 2x3 factorial design matrix for our field experiment. Table 1
shows that for every combination of the starting time and auction format we collected
10 observations for the DVD and 5 observations for the coin.
Table 1: The 2x3 factorial design matrix of the field experiment
Starting time 08:00 a.m. Starting time 08:00 p.m.
Minimum Reserve Price 10 DVDs / 5 Coins 10 DVDs / 5 Coins
WTA Reserve Price 10 DVDs / 5 Coins 10 DVDs / 5 Coins
WTA Confederate Bid 10 DVDs / 5 Coins 10 DVDs / 5 Coins
To avoid any confounding effects of reputation we used a unique new seller name for
each of the rounds. Since the seller accounts were created specifically for the experi-
ment, all feedback sheets were empty.8 The confederate bidder account was specifically
created for the experiment. In the treatments with WTA confederate bids, this account
8The fact that seller reputation can have an effect on outcomes was shown empirically by Katkar and
Reiley (2005) and experimentally by Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2003). Others however find these
reputation effect negligible (Kaufmann and Wood (2004), Ariely and Simonson (2003))
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was used to submit a bid at the level of the WTA reserve price. Both the bid submis-
sion of the confederate and the auction configuration were automatized in order to avoid
errors and delays.
4 Results
4.1 The distribution of prices
Figure 1 shows the prices of all auctioned DVDs. The 20 sessions are presented in
chronological order with a separate curve for each different treatment of the DVD auc-
tions. While the price is volatile over time, it is immediately obvious that none of the
treatment curves lie clearly above or below the others. In fact, applying the Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test to pairwise comparison, we find no significant differ-
ences between the prices.9 In other words, the DVD prices neither react to the size of
the public reserve price nor to the confederate bid. Hence, for the case of the DVDs,
we must reject all six alternative hypotheses presented in section 2 in favor of the null
hypotheses that there is no difference between prices across treatments. Even a closer
look at the distribution of prices that takes the starting time of the auction into consider-
ation reveals no differences between treatments. Perhaps it is the high trading volume in
the market of the blockbuster DVD that overrides any possible effects of reserve prices.10
To check whether the results of the DVD sessions are only due to the high sales volume,
we ran a second series of auctions using a unique collector’s item. By bundling a col-
lector’s coin with the coin booklet11, we created a unique item neither sold in an online
9In the 17th session of the WTA confederate bid treatment, we had to buy the DVD because there was
no higher bid than 10.00 Euro. The highest bid that was placed by a non-confederate bidder was also
10.00 Euro. Hence, we can conclude that the price in this auction would not have been above 10.00 Euro
even without the confederate. This also means that there is no problem including the price in our treatment
comparison, because the corresponding auctions in the other two treatments have higher prices anyway.
Nevertheless, we tested all hypotheses excluding this bid and found no differences to the results reported.
10The average price (11.82) we achieved in the DVD auctions was well below the retail price (19.99
Euro) of the DVD, even if we add the shipping and handling costs for the auction buyers (3.50 Euro).
Making losses in such field experiments is common (Ariely and Simonson (2003)).
11The coin booklet is a plastic envelope, in which the coin is placed together with brief description.
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Figure 1: Prices in the 3 DVD treatments
shop nor auctioned online.12 The experimental procedure we used was identical to the
procedure used for the DVD auctions. Again, we ran all three treatments in parallel in
each session.
Figure 2 shows the prices we achieved for the coin bundles in each of the 10 sessions.
Once again we find volatility in prices over time but no clear differences between the
prices in the three treatments. The visual impression is supported by the fact that we
cannot find any significant differences between the prices across treatments using the
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test.13 In other words, the volume of sales,
which is much lower with our unique collector’s item than in the case of the DVD block-
buster item, does not effect our basic finding that prices are unaffected by the sellers
reserve price policy. As in the case of the DVDs, we must reject all 6 alternative hy-
12The coin for itself was traded online.
13In Session 10 of the WTA reserve price treatment, the coin bundle was not sold. We therefore exclude
Session 10 from the treatment comparisons. In the sessions 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 of this treatment, the coin
bundles were sold at the reserve price of 3.00 Euro. In the confederate treatment, our confederate had to
buy the coin bundle only in session 8. Therefore we exclude session 8 from the treatment comparisons.
9
Figure 2: Prices in the 3 coin treatments
potheses presented in section 2 in favor of the null hypotheses that reserve prices have
no effect on prices.
We also checked for differences in prices due to the auction termination time of the
day. We find no differences between morning and evening terminations for either good.
Day of weeks effects are not easily detectable in our experiment, but even if they are
present they would effect all three treatments in the same way and thus cancel out in our
comparison.
4.2 Distribution of bids
Although we do not find any treatment effects when analyzing the prices, it could be
that some of the prerequisites for the hypotheses in the literature are present in our data.
One of these phenomena is that the number of bids submitted in the WTA reserve price
treatment is lower than in other treatments. Table 2 shows the average number of bids in
each treatment for both auctioned items. It is obvious that we observe less bids in auc-
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Table 2: Average number of bids in the DVD and the coin treatments
Minimum Reserve Price WTA Reserve Price WTA Confederate Bid
DVDs 7.45 2.75 5.30
Coin bundles 3.60 1.90 2.50
tions with a WTA reserve price and we can show this effect to be statistically significant
(1 percent level, one-tailed, for the DVD experiment and 5 percent level, one-tailed, for
the coin experiment).14
Together with the fact that we do not observe treatment differences in prices, this result
seems to indicate that high bidding activity levels have not induced the type of bidding
behavior that is related to auction fever. We seem to observe an unemotional environment
in which the serious bidders remain unimpressed by the high volume of activity in the
early phase of the auction.
4.3 Seller’s Net Revenue
We established that prices are indistinguishable across treatments leaving sellers with
the same expected amount of revenue, no matter which reserve price policy is chosen.
However, a seller’s net revenue does not only depend on the auction price, but also on
the auction fees. Since the different reserve price policies incur different placement fees,
a seller’s decision on which policy to choose must incorporate these fees. Table 3 shows
the average net revenue achieved by sellers in each treatment and for each item. Since
placing a WTA reserve price incurs substantial auction fees, average net revenue in the
treatments with WTA reserve prices are lower than in the other two treatments. Using
the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank Test, however, we find this difference to be
statistically significant only in the case of the DVDs and not in case of the coins.
14To test the statistical significance we use the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test.
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Table 3: Average net revenues
Minimum Reserve Price WTA Reserve Price WTA Confederate Bid
DVDs 11.93 11.63 11.89
Coin bundles 3.20 3.56 3.58
4.4 Dispersion of payoffs
So far we have seen that WTA reserve prices are empirically dominated by the other two
setups, because the revenues are indistinguishable, but the fees are substantially higher in
the former than in the latter. Comparing the other two treatments, the WTA confederate
bid treatment may be preferred by sellers over the treatment with a minimum reserve
price, if the risk of selling at a low price is diminished by engaging a WTA confederate
bidder. To test this hypothesis, we compare the dispersion of payoffs across treatments.
Table 4 displays the mean absolute deviation from the average payoffs.
Table 4: Mean absolute deviation from the average payoffs
Minimum Reserve Price WTA Reserve Price WTA Confederate Bid
DVDs 0.8394 1.2378 0.9602
Coin bundles 0.551 0.7174 0.655
It is obvious that the dispersion of payoffs in the WTA confederate bid treatment is not
substantially different than that in the minimum reserve price Treatment. Correspond-
ingly, no significant differences can be found across the two treatments. Hence, we can
conclude that empirically there is no advantage in using WTA confederate bidding to
reduce the dispersion of payoffs. We additionally checked whether the payoff dispersion
with a WTA reserve price is significantly greater than in the other two treatments. While
the mean absolute deviation is slightly greater in that treatment than in the others, we
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cannot identify significant differences. Interestingly the sales volume has no effect on
these comparisons. Even in the coin auctions, in which higher dispersion could have
been assumed due to the low sales volume, we cannot identify any significant dispersion
effects.
5 Setting the optimal reserve price
Perhaps our WTA reserve prices and our WTA confederate bids did not have a direct im-
pact on revenues, because they were only selected to guarantee a minimum transaction
price. While securing the transaction in this way is a legitimate and frequently observed
behavior, auction theory predicts that sellers will use the reserve price to maximize ex-
pected payoff (Riley and Samuelson 1981; Meyerson 1981). In this section, we present
a follow-up experiment, in which we first estimate optimal reserve prices and then use
these to compare WTA reserve price and the corresponding WTA confederate bid auc-
tions to the baseline of minimum reserve price auctions. Using the same experimental
setup as before (see section 3), we auction 4 triples of 5 blockbuster DVDs on on the
online auction plattform.
Unlike the auctions in the previous experiment, we expect a high frequency of auctions
without a transaction when using the optimal reserve price (or the corresponding optimal
confederate bid). This is due to the fact that the optimal reserve price does not maximize
sales, but the expected revenue for a risk-neutral seller. Riley and Samuelson (1981)
show that the optimal reserve price in a standard private value auction with valuations
drawn from the interval [0, 1] is:
r∗ = v0 +
1− F (r)
f(r)
(1)
If valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution between [a, b] the optimal reserve
price is:
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r∗ =
v0 + b
2
(2)
Hence, if we assume a uniform distribution of valuations, we can compute the optimal
reserve price, given we know the bounds of the interval of valuations, i.e. a and b. These
bounds are generally not known to the sellers in the field. However, they can be estimated
by assessing the number of bidders n as well as the expected value and variance of prices
from past auctions. Assuming that the prices observed in the field will generally be a
good estimate of the second highest valuation, we can use the following formulas for the
expected value and the variance of the second-order statistic to calculate the bounds of
the uniform distribution.15
E(a + (b− a)Beta((n− 1), 2)) = b(n− 1) + 2a
(n + 1)
(3)
V ar(a + (b− a)Beta((n− 1), 2)) = (b− a)2 (2n− 2)
(n + 1)2(n + 2)
(4)
To calculate the optimal reserve price we collected two weeks of data from the auctions
on the platform offering our 5 blockbuster DVDs. From this data, we estimated the num-
ber of bidders n. On average, 4 bidders participated in the auctions we observed. Using
the prices in the same data set, we estimated the expected value and the variance of the
second highest private valuation. With n = 4 and the expected value and variance esti-
mates, we computed the bounds a and b of the uniform distribution of valuations. Setting
v0 = 0, with n, a, and b we calculated the optimal reserve prices presented in table 5.16
The optimal confederate bids were set one bid increment below the corresponding op-
timal reserve prices, in order to account for the fact that bidders can bid exactly on the
reserve price, but must outbid the optimal confederate bid.
15For more details see Appendix.
16We will come back to the discussion of the assumption v0 = 0 at the end of this section.
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Table 5: Optimal reserve prices
DVD Nr. DVD Optimal Reserve Price Optimal Confederate Bid
1 Fool’s Gold 7,00 Euro 6,50 Euro
2 Keinohrhasen 7,90 Euro 7,40 Euro
3 P.S. I love you 9,70 Euro 9,20 Euro
4 Shaun the Sheep 7,40 Euro 6,90 Euro
5 Step Up to the Streets 11,70 Euro 11,20 Euro
Figure 3 shows the optimal reserve prices, the optimal confederate bids, and the realized
prices of the DVDs sold in our three treatments. Note that we have four realized prices
for each DVD in the minimum reserve price treatment. In the other two treatments we
rarely sold the items. DVD 1 was not at all sold in the optimal reserve price treatment
and sold only one out of four times in the optimal confederate bid treatment. DVD 2 and
DVD 3 were each sold twice in the optimal confederate bid treatment and only once in
the optimal reserve price treatment. DVD 4 was sold twice in the optimal reserve price
treatment and only once in the optimal confederate bid treatment. DVD 5 was sold only
once in each of the two treatments. However, each time a DVD was sold in the optimal
reserve price or optimal confederate bid treatment the achieved price was higher than the
average price in the minimum reserve price treatment. Taking the five DVDs together
we can show that average price in the minimum reserve price treatments are significantly
lower than in each of the other two treatments (two-tailed Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Sign
Rank Test, p < 0.05).
Achieving higher prices seems desirable on first sight but must be traded off against the
lower expected sales and - in the case of the optimal reserve price treatment - against the
higher auction fees. Let us assume that the seller owns a single DVD and can choose
between the three auction setups. If he uses the minimum reserve price setup he will
15
Figure 3: Prices in the optimal reserve price experiment
sell his DVD for sure at the first auction and only pay a small auction fee. If he uses the
optimal reserve price, he can expect to sell his DVD only one fourth of the time. Hence,
in expectations the seller pays four times the auction fee for selling a unit. Remember
that the auction fee in this case is relatively high because the optimal reserve price is
much greater than the minimum reserve price. Taking these fees into consideration the
expected net revenue in the optimal reserve price treatment is significantly lower than
in the minimum reserve price treatment (two-tailed Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Sign Rank
Test, p < 0.05). Figure 4 displays the expected net revenue per unit in each of our three
treatments.
Interestingly the expected net revenue in the optimal confederate bid treatment is also
significantly higher than in the optimal reserve price treatment. This is due to the fact
that higher sales prices are achieved without additional auction fees. Comparing the ex-
pected net revenue in the optimal confederate bid setting to the minimum reserve price
setting we do not find a significant difference. While the auctions with an optimal con-
federate bid achieve higher prices, they also incur higher auction fees due to the cases
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Figure 4: Expected net revenue per unit
in which the confederate is forced to buy the item. In conclusion, the question whether
minimum reserve price auctions with or without optimal confederate bidding are more
profitable depends on the distribution of values and the comparison of auction fees.
There are two caveats in the theoretic treatment of the optimal reserve prices that we
have presented here. On the one hand, we assume that the seller’s value of the item is
zero, i.e. v0 = 0. If sellers actually have higher valuations than we have assumed, the
optimal reserve prices would be even higher, leading to even lower sales probabilities.17
One possible reason why the theoretically optimal reservation prices seem to high in the
field is that optimal auction theory does not take the competition amongst auctions into
account.18
17Using the lowest observed market price as rough estimate of the sellers WTA we calculated optimal
reserve prices that were basically outside the scope of observed prices. We decided to use the optimal
reserve price based on a WTA of zero, instead.
18There have been several studies analyzing multiple auctions both theoretically (Peters and Severinov
(2006) Stryszowska (2005)) and experimentally (Hoppe (2008)). None of the papers we know of has
attempted to derive the optimal reservation price in such an environment.
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On the other hand, we do not take the fee of setting a WTA reserve price into consid-
eration when calculating the optimal reserve price. If we would consider the fees, the
optimal reserve price would most probably be lower than we assume. Note that no theo-
retical approach has been introduced so far that would enable us to calculate the optimal
reserve price under the condition that auction fees vary with the size of the reserve price.
This obviously is outside the scope of this empirical paper and remains a challenge for
auction theory.
6 Do other sellers achieve higher prices?
In the follow-up experiment with the optimal reserve price, we find that auctions with
optimal confederate bids result in significantly higher prices than auctions with the min-
imum reserve price (two-tailed Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Sign Rank Test, p < 0.05).
In this section, we compare the prices that we achieve in our auctions with the prices
achieved in "naturally" occurring auctions during the same time period. If we find that
the prices in our minimum reserve price auctions are below the other market prices in
similar auctions, then we can conjecture that confederate bids may have been employed
in the market. We run a regression using all prices from our minimum reserve price
auctions and from all other auctions on the platform selling the same items during the
time the follow-up experiment was conducted.19 To control the effect of reputations we
run the regression both with the reputation score or the number of negative ratings as
parameters. We also include the shipping fee and the cost of delivery insurance in the
regressions. Furthermore, we control for the effect of each specific movie using dummy
variables. Table 6 shows the results of our regressions.
19The market data consists of all auctions of the corresponding items that ended on any of the 6 days
during which our follow-up experiment was conducted. We collected only the data for new unused DVDs
from our list. Only auctions with the minimum reserve price were considered.
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Table 6: Regression
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Price Price Price
Our auction -1.635*** -1.580** -1.622**
(0.622) (0.622) (0.627)
Shaun 0.345 0.295 0.360
(0.930) (0.929) (0.931)
Keinohr 1.491** 1.466** 1.534**
(0.652) (0.652) (0.656)
P.S. 2.180*** 2.120*** 2.132***
(0.716) (0.716) (0.718)
Step up 3.650*** 3.582*** 3.667***
(0.839) (0.840) (0.841)
Shipping fee -0.621 -0.498 -0.601
(0.387) (0.398) (0.388)
Insurance -0.571 -0.663 -0.580
(0.640) (0.643) (0.644)
Num. ratings -2.86e-05
(6.01e-05)
Score -0.000229
(0.000213)
Negative ratings -0.0260
(0.0202)
Constant 10.14*** 9.972*** 12.38***
(1.325) (1.330) (2.447)
Observations 221 221 221
R2 0.160 0.166 0.166
Adj. R2 0.132 0.135 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In column (1), the coefficients and standard errors are shown for a model in which no
reputation score is included. We see that some specific DVD dummies are highly signif-
icant reflecting the fact that the DVDs had different market demand. For our analysis,
however, the only fact to notice is that the price in our auctions with minimum reserve
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price is significantly lower than the price achieved in the other auctions with a minimum
reserve price. As columns (2) and (3) show the result is robust even if we include the
number of negative ratings or the number total ratings and the reputation score, corre-
spondingly.20 Note that the shipping fee and the insurance cost exhibit negative but not
significant coefficients. In other words, the price differences that we observe between
our auctions and those of others are neither due to additional costs (shipping fees and
insurance cost) nor due to differences in the reputation score. Hence, we conjecture that
at least some fraction of the other sellers is using confederate bids as an alternative to
optimal reserve prices.
7 Conclusions
The literature on online auctions is rich but relatively young. While numerous different
hypotheses have been presented concerning the optimal reserve price policy in online
auctions, the empirical evidence has been ambiguous. With our field experiment we pro-
vide some insight into the effect of alternate reserve price policies. To our surprise we
find that neither a seller’s WTA reserve price nor a WTA confederate bid have an effect
on the auction revenue. We neither find evidence for auction fever nor for the reluctance
to bid in the treatments with minimum reserve prices and confederate bids. We also do
not find that serious bidders are deterred by WTA reserve prices. It seems that bidders
are more rational and less emotional than often assumed in the literature.
The fact that neither reserve prices nor confederate bids at WTA level have a negative
effect on the auction outcome is in line with optimal auction theory. To test the impli-
cations of that theory we present a novel approach to estimate the optimal reserve price
from field data and report a follow-up experiment. The result of the experiment with
20On first sight, it seems surprising that the coefficients for the reputation scores are non significant in
regressions. But the literature on reputation in online auctions generally shows either no effects or very
small effects of reputation on prices (Dellarocas 2007). Especially, low price items such as coins seem to
be less affected by seller reputation (Kauffman and Wood (2003)).
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optimal reserve prices and optimal confederate bids is striking. We find that the number
of successful auctions drops dramatically, but the prices achieved when an auction is
successful are significantly higher than in the case with the minimum reserve price. This
indicates that if sellers of unsuccessful auctions can return for a "second try" with the
same item, the expected revenue can be increased as long as the cost of auction re-runs
is low. This is true in the case of optimal confederate bids, but not in the case of optimal
reserve prices, due to the relatively high fee for setting reserve prices. Hence, for non-
perishable goods it seems that the expected revenue of a seller on some auction platforms
is maximized by using the minimum reserve price in combination with a confederate bid
at the level of the optimal reserve price. Our regression in section 6 indicates that this
strategy is perhaps already being employed by some sellers.
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A Appendix
For a uniform distribution between [0, 1] the kth the second highest value is beta dis-
tributed: Beta ((n − 1), n + 1 − (n − 1)) = Beta ((n − 1), 2).21 The expected value is
Beta(p, q) = p
(p+q)
, the variance is Beta(p, q) = pq
(p+q)2(p+q+1)
.
E(Beta((n− 1), 2) = (n− 1)
(n + 1)
(5)
V ar(Beta((n− 1), 2) = (2n− 2))
(n + 1)2((n + 2)
(6)
Due to the fact that our values are drawn from a uniform distribution between [a, b] we
need a linear transformed beta distribution: a + (b− a)Beta(p, q). Since E(u + vX) =
u + vE(X) and V ar(u + v(X)) = v2 ∗ V ar(X),
E(a + (b− a)Beta((n− 1), 2)) = b(n− 1) + 2a
(n + 1)
(7)
V ar(a + (b− a)Beta((n− 1), 2)) = (b− a)2 (2n− 2)
(n + 1)2(n + 2)
(8)
21In auction theory the second highest value is often referred to as second order statistic (see Krishna
(2001)). In contrast statisticians refer to the distribution of the second highest value as the (n − 1) order
statistic (see David and Nagaraja (2003)).
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